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EXPIRED  PATENTS,  TRADE  SECRETS,  AND
STYMIED  COMPETITION
W. Nicholson Price II*
Patents and trade secrecy have long been considered substitute incentives for innovation.
When inventors create a new invention, they traditionally must choose between the two.  And if
inventors choose to patent their invention, society provides strong legal protection in exchange for
disclosure, with the understanding that the protection has a limit: it expires twenty years from the
date of filing.  At that time, the invention is opened to the public and exposed to competition.
This story is incomplete.  Patent disclosure is weak and focuses on one technical piece of an
invention—but that piece is often only a part of the market-relevant innovation.  Patent-holding
innovators use various tactics to distort the patent bargain and prolong effective monopolies
beyond the patent’s expiration date.  These tactics include using patented inventions to generate
secret information, relying on the timing difference between patent filing and product marketing
to make disclosure nearly irrelevant, and tying secret components to patented frameworks.
While these phenomena have been noted before, this Article joins them together as examples
of ways that innovators avoid the competition-promoting function of patent expiration, ulti-
mately limiting the benefit the public receives from patented inventions.  It also suggests that the
most problematic cases likely involve markets where additional factors, such as regulation or other
market irregularities, require that goods be interchangeable.  Finally, it proposes the concept of
economic enablement: patentees may have a responsibility to enable not just the bare technical
invention disclosed in a patent, but rather the minimum information necessary to exploit com-
mercially the patented invention.  Against the background of the newly enacted Federal Defend
Trade Secrets Act, courts and scholars alike should examine the boundaries between trade secrets
and patents to ensure that the overlap does not distort the policy goal of incentivizing and pro-
moting both innovation and competition.
INTRODUCTION
The patent system reflects a bargain between an inventor and society.
The inventor invents and discloses the invention, and in return society grants
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her rights in the invention for a limited period of time.1  This bargain is
carefully crafted; Congress and the courts consistently tinker with the system
with the aim of reaching the right balance of incentives and costs.  This tink-
ering also sets the boundaries between the patent system and the incentives
provided by the nominally complementary trade secret system.
Underlying these intellectual property mechanisms, and others, is the
recognition that the competitive benefits conferred upon inventors are lim-
ited, and that when those limits are reached, we expect that broader competi-
tion, with its attendant public benefits, becomes possible.  Patents expire
after twenty years, and trade secrets can be reverse-engineered.2  These limits
function as safety valves to ensure that competition can eventually take place,
and doctrines have been created specifically to enable that robust competi-
tion once the limits are reached.3
But inventors and lawyers are clever.  In multiple important types of
innovation, firms use the interlocking effects of patents and difficult-to-
reverse-engineer trade secrets to maintain monopolies long past patent expi-
ration.4  These post-expiration monopolies are strongest in markets for inter-
changeable goods—that is, markets, like those for drugs, weapons, and some
medical tests, where competing products must perform the same and be
interchangeable.5  Post-expiration monopolies can be protected in several
ways.  Information generated about the patented invention itself necessary
1 See Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Meta-
phor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1316 (2004) (noting that “[p]atents are
commonly understood as a hypothetical contract between the inventor and the govern-
ment” and later critiquing this conception); see also W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating
Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1775–76 (2016).
2 Regulatory-mediated market exclusivity, a pseudo-IP benefit conferred in some
industries, similarly expires. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation
Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348, 359–64 (2007); Yaniv Heled, Regula-
tory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 305–09 (2015).
3 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012) (creating a safe harbor for otherwise infring-
ing conduct taken to prepare a generic drug for regulatory approval to ensure that generic
drugs can enter the market promptly upon the expiration of the patent covering the inno-
vator drug).
4 Firms can distort the intended patent bargain in many other ways not discussed in
this Article.  Among the best recognized is the failure to disclose adequately the features of
an innovation at the time of patenting. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 539, 551 (2009) (“Ineffective disclosure . . . can also prolong the patent right beyond
its stated expiration because more of the useful information about an invention remains
only in the patentee’s hands.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L.
REV. 123 (2006); Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012).  Various methods of gaming the patent system to maintain patent-
protected monopolies through patenting different parts or versions of an innovation are
also well described. See Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of
Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499 (2016); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for
Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553
(2006).
5 See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 609 F. Supp. 1174, 1176–77
(C.D. Ill. 1985); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 4, at 500.
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for economic exploitation but generated after filing may be kept secret, and
may thus hinder competition.6  Relatedly, trade secrecy may be used to pro-
tect required economic complements of a patented invention, in a form of
innovation bundling, such that neither the invention nor the complements
can be reasonably developed without access to the trade secrets.7  Finally,
information generated by the patent-protected technology, and required for
market success, may also be kept secret.8  Through these various mecha-
nisms, patentees can double-dip, obtaining the benefits of the patent system
for a limited term but then using trade secrecy to block competition in the
patented product after that term expires.  This double-dipping is contrary to
the goal of the intellectual property system that innovation be driven by lim-
ited monopolies.  The limits on monopolies are important because the public
receives benefits from competition in the form of lower prices and increased
access.9
How might these distortions be undone, and the patent bargain
improved, at least in this respect?  The enablement doctrine provides a
potential blueprint.  Under the enablement doctrine, a patentee must pro-
vide enough information that an ordinarily skilled artisan can “make and
use” the claimed invention.10  But as described in detail below, mere techni-
cal enablement will often fall short of holding up the patentee’s end of the
patent bargain in terms of social welfare, innovation, and competition.11  If
competitors cannot meaningfully make and use the invention after patent
expiration, the patentee hasn’t disclosed enough.  One could imagine a sepa-
rate enablement requirement—embedded in patent law or somewhere
else—that focuses on economic enablement.  Under such a requirement, the
patentee would need to provide sufficient information that an ordinarily
skilled and similarly equipped market participant would be able to compete
reasonably—even if not ultimately successfully—in the market upon expira-
tion of the patent term.
This Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part I describes the patent bargain
and the relationship between patents and trade secrecy, including the long-
standing view that they are substitute inventions and the growing recognition
that they may function as complements in some situations.  Part II discusses
6 See infra Section III.A; see also W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing
Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023 (2016) (discussing this
issue in the context of biologics and biosimilars).  An important distinction is between
further information created that is necessary for economic exploitation (e.g., non-discover-
able product details required for regulatory approval, see id.) and information created that
merely confers a competitive advantage (e.g., know-how that allows more efficient manu-
facturing). See infra Part IV.
7 See infra Section III.B.
8 See infra Section III.C; see also Dan L. Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized
Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 233 (2015); Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-
Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
9 See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 4, at 500.
10 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
11 See infra subsection IV.B.1.
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the patent system’s express policy of competition after patent expiration.
Part III addresses three cases where secrecy is used to distort the bargain
contrary to this policy and to limit competition: secret later-generated infor-
mation about the invention necessary for its economic use, secret economic
complements, and secret information generated by patented inventions.
Part IV presents a very preliminary framework for limiting these distortions
of the patent bargain by creating a requirement parallel to the technical
enablement requirement of the patent system: an economic enablement
requirement.
I. PATENTS AND TRADE SECRECY
Patents and trade secrets have a complex relationship.12  Both cover
technological or industrial innovation.13  Both systems have as their goal the
development and deployment of such innovation.14  But they aim to reach
these goals through markedly distinct mechanisms.15  Patents reflect a con-
sidered bargain: inventors are rewarded with a limited-term monopoly16 over
the patented invention in exchange for developing and disclosing the inven-
tion.  An essential part of this bargain is its limit: patents expire, and after
patent expiration, the invention is expected to enter free public use.17  Trade
secrets are different; they lack a set expiration date, but have their own limit:
competitors can lawfully reverse-engineer or independently invent the trade
secret, and protection is then lost.18  This Part briefly describes the two
regimes, and then discusses how the two can interact, whether as substitutes
under a traditional view, or as complements.
A. Patents
Patents trade disclosure for a term-limited, legally enforced right to
exclude.19  Under the terms of the patent bargain, an inventor shares the
knowledge of her invention with the public through the disclosure of the
patent document itself, and receives in exchange (and arguably in exchange
for the invention itself) a limited period of time—twenty years from the date
of patent filing, with some modifications—during which she may legally pre-
12 See Price, supra note 1.
13 See id. at 1775–76.
14 See id. at 1775.
15 See id. at 1771–72.
16 I acknowledge that patents often do not in fact result in monopolies. See Stephen
Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 117–54), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2731216.
However, the term “monopoly” is useful, if imprecise, shorthand for the competitive advan-
tage conveyed by the right to exclude and reflects the essential nature of the patent bar-
gain. See id. at 119 n.62 (noting examples of courts and scholarship taking the monopoly
framing as a starting point to evaluate patents’ competitive benefits).
17 See Price, supra note 1, at 1775–76.
18 See id. at 1776.
19 See id. at 1775–76.
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vent others from making, using, selling, or importing the invention.20  This
right of exclusion (theoretically) enables the inventor to capture a greater
portion of the social welfare gain from the invention than if other competi-
tors could immediately free-ride on the invention by marketing their own
versions of the invention without having had to invest the funds necessary to
create it in the first place.21  At the end of the patent term, the right to
exclude terminates, and competitors may practice and sell the previously pat-
ented invention, leading to competition and expected price decreases for the
public.
B. Trade Secrets
Trade secrecy works differently.  Trade secrecy also allows an inventor to
appropriate the social welfare gain from his invention through exclusivity,
but that exclusivity is primarily based on secrecy; if competitors do not know
the necessary information about the innovation, they cannot free-ride.22
Trade secrecy as a body of law supports the role of actual secrecy, including
confidentiality requirements, by providing legal mechanisms to prevent and
punish the appropriation of information reasonably kept secret.23  Trade
secrecy was until 2016 a creature largely of state law,24 but in 2016 Congress
passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act, creating a federal civil cause of action
for misappropriation of trade secrets.25  Now state and federal trade secret
law exist in parallel.  Trade secrets, unlike patents, can persist indefinitely;
some last for many decades.26  They also require no registration or govern-
ment vetting process, unlike patents.27  But trade secrets have a strong safety
valve that patents lack: independent invention and reverse-engineering are
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (setting the patent term at twenty years); id. § 271 (stat-
ing what conduct constitutes patent infringement); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil &
Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (noting that the “quid pro quo [for limited exclusivity]
is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail”).
21 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (examining the ex ante incentive theory of patents in some depth,
and considering ex post justifications as well).
22 See Price, supra note 1, at 1776.  This basic description necessarily omits much.  For
a view that initial innovators may be helped by sharing information with competitors, see
Laura Pedraza-Farina, Spill Your (Trade) Secrets: Knowledge Networks as Innovation Drivers, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1570–81 (2017).
23 See Pedraza-Farina, supra note 22, at 1570–81.
24 See Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV.
317, 320 (2015).
25 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  In addition, the Economic Espionage Act, enacted in
1996, created criminal penalties for certain invasions of trade secrecy.  Pub. L. No. 104-294,
110 Stat. 3488 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2012)); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1831.
26 See Price, supra note 1, at 1777.
27 See id. at 1778.
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not forbidden by trade secret law.28  That is, if an invention is valuable
enough, competitors can independently develop or reverse-engineer the
information, and then the protection and advantage conferred by trade
secrecy is lost.29  This possibility is not always realizable in practice.30
C. Patent-Trade Secret Interactions
As different ways to protect the same sort of innovation, the doctrines of
patents and trade secrecy are in substantial dialogue.31  Traditionally, they
have been described as substitutes; that is, inventors pick one or the other,
and proceed accordingly.32  However, there is a growing recognition that
they can also be complements; that is, the protections of patents and trade
secrecy can be used together to protect an invention or a suite of
inventions.33
1. Substitutes
The traditional view of patents and trade secrets is that they are substi-
tutes, such that only one may cover any given invention.34  Inventors must
choose one form of protection, depending on which they believe more likely
to provide more value, considering the difference in term, expense, enforce-
ability, and other factors.35  They may not choose both for precisely the same
28 Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 241, 250–51 (1998).
29 See id.
30 As discussed below, reverse-engineering and independent invention are not always
realistically possible; this reality can sometimes have quite substantial consequences. See
infra Section III.A.
31 See, e.g., Price, supra note 1; Simon & Sichelman, supra note 8.
32 Various sources note the views of patents and trade secrets as substitutes and com-
plements, and will be cited throughout this Section.  For an excellent recent summary—to
which this Section owes much of its framing—see Simon & Sichelman, supra note 8, at
8–15.
33 See, e.g., Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness: An Unsuspected Syn-
ergy, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2008).
34 J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 923–24 (2011);
Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV.
311, 314 (2008); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1494 (2002); Simon & Sichelman, supra note 8, at
8–12.
35 Various authors have provided guidance on this decision. See, e.g., Andrew Becker-
man-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and Busi-
ness Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371 (2002); Michael R. McGurk & Jia W.
Lu, The Intersection of Patents and Trade Secrets, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 189, 198–209
(2015) (listing seven factors to consider: patentability, term of protection, enforcement,
injunctions, prior user rights, disclosure, and costs); Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade
Secret Decision: An Industrial Perspective, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689 (1996).  In
other intellectual property contexts, the presumed-defunct doctrine of “election” was once
used to suggest that applicants seeking intellectual-property protection affirmatively had to
select one option. See, e.g., Doris E. Long, First, “Let’s Kill All the Intellectual Property Law-
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invention—the traditional account goes—because of the disclosure require-
ment of the patent system.36  Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the inventor must dis-
close enough information to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art
to make and use the invention; the inventor must also provide sufficient
information to demonstrate that she “possesses” the information at the time
of filing.37  Once information is disclosed through the patent system, it can
no longer be kept secret.
The choice does not always exist for a given invention.  The Supreme
Court in Kewanee Oil v. Bicron described three categories of inventions kept as
trade secrets:
(1) the trade secret believed by its owner to constitute a validly patentable
invention; (2) the trade secret known to its owner not to be so patentable;
and (3) the trade secret whose valid patentability is considered dubious.38
That is to say, while almost all commercially valuable information that
can be kept secret can be kept as a trade secret,39 many inventions are not
patentable, whether because they are not absolutely novel, because they may
be considered obvious, or because they fail to fall into the categories of statu-
tory patent eligibility.40  Thus, a particular invention will often not be patent-
able.  In the converse situation, different innovations are patentable but not
protectable as trade secrets for the simple reason that they are already public;
while an inventor can (in some circumstances) file a patent within a year of
publicly disclosing the invention,41 such disclosure destroys the possibility of
using trade secrecy.
In both scholarship and court opinions, the dominant view is that an
invention cannot be protected by both a patent and trade secrecy.  However,
this view relies on the identity of the invention being the same under both
regimes.  This need not always be the case.
2. Complements
As a number of commentators and practitioners have recognized, pat-
ents and trade secrecy can both be used to protect an invention so long as
yers!”: Musings on the Decline and Fall of the Intellectual Property Empire, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
851, 872–90 (2001) (describing the rise, fall, and potential re-rise of the election doctrine).
36 See Fromer, supra note 4; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Informa-
tion?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545 (2012); Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or
Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007 (2005).
37 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (noting that enablement and written description requirements
are distinct); see J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1577–80
(2016) (summarizing the requirements of § 112).
38 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974) (quoting Painton & Co.
v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224 (2d Cir. 1971)).
39 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
40 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 101, respectively.
41 See id. § 102(b) (creating a statutory grace period).
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they do not protect exactly the same thing.42  This can be accomplished in
multiple ways.
Different, linked aspects of an invention may be protected through pat-
ents and trade secrets.43  For instance, a drug may be patented, but the meth-
ods of manufacturing that drug may be protected by trade secret.44
Similarly, details of how to finish, commercialize, manufacture, and market a
patented product are typically protectable by trade secret.45
A second recognized method of using patents and trade secrets as com-
plements is to disclose the general invention in the patent, but to keep the
preferred way to practice that invention as a trade secret.  Thus, a patentee
can claim a broad group of inventions, but keep secret the precise member
of that group she has determined will work best and be most commercially
successful.46  Theoretically, the best mode requirement prevents this prac-
tice; under § 112, a patent applicant must disclose what she contemplates as
the best way of practicing the invention.47  But the requirement has many
limitations.  Best modes discovered after patent filing are not covered;
indeed, there is no mechanism by which a patent disclosure can be updated
after filing.48  Best modes developed by a licensee or an assignee need not be
disclosed.49  And after the passage of the America Invents Act (AIA), the best
mode requirement is no longer grounds to invalidate a patent, making it a
rather toothless requirement enforceable only by a near-psychic patent
examiner.50
Inventors know about and use this complementarity; law firms
encourage it.51  And much complementarity is entirely reasonable and per-
mitted within the current system.  The next Part, however, discusses an aspect
of the patent system in tension with at least some complementary uses: the
desire for robust competition after the expiration of a patent.
42 See, e.g., Jorda, supra note 33, at 19 (“The goal is to integrate patents and trade
secrets for optimal synergistic protection of any innovation.”); Love & Seaman, supra note
4; McGurk & Lu, supra note 35, at 209 (“Patents and trade secrets are not incompatible but
complementary.”); Simon & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 12–15.
43 McGurk & Lu, supra note 35, at 211.
44 See W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 536–38 (2014) (describing the efficiency gain of
a new method of producing veterinary penicillin and the trade secret protection of that
new method).
45 See infra Part III.
46 See Love & Seaman, supra note 4; Simon & Sichelman, supra note 8.
47 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification . . . shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.”).
48 See Simon & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 14–15.
49 McGurk & Lu, supra note 35, at 212.
50 See Ryan Vacca, Patent Reform and Best Mode: A Signal to the Patent Office or a Step
Toward Elimination?, 75 ALB. L. REV. 279, 293–94 (2012).
51 See Love & Seaman, supra note 4, at 12 & n.58 (quoting AIA updates to clients from
Baker Botts and Venable noting that best modes may be kept secret even while patent
protection is sought).
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II. COMPETITION AFTER PATENT EXPIRATION
A key aspect of intellectual property exclusivity is that its protection
comes with built-in limits.  Most relevant for this context, patents expire after
twenty years.52  This limit reflects an underlying policy: excessive monopolies
are disfavored.  Monopolies create deadweight loss because a monopolist sets
prices at a level higher than those that would maximize aggregate social wel-
fare.  The result is that the monopolist is better off—but consumers are
worse off, and by a greater amount than the monopolist is better off.  The
intellectual property system tolerates this as a means to create incentives for
innovation—that’s the whole point—but longer monopolies than needed to
drive innovation are social pain without offsetting gain.  Ideally, the monop-
oly should last just long enough to provide a sufficient ex ante incentive for
innovation, and then end in favor of competition and decreased prices.53
Realistically, trying to tailor monopoly scope like this is very hard and comes
with high transaction costs, so the intellectual property system relies instead
on uniform terms.54
This goal of limited monopolies, followed by competition, appears in
numerous doctrines and decisions throughout patent law.  Perhaps the most
obvious is the best mode requirement.  In 2007, the House Judiciary Commit-
tee explained the purpose of this requirement: to “reward[ ] inventors for
teaching the public how to make and use their inventions in the best, most
effective way of which they are aware. Its inclusion . . . is intended to preclude a
patentee from maintaining a competitive advantage after patent expiration.”55  That
is to say, an inventor should not be able to patent an invention but keep the
best way to practice that invention to herself for later competitive benefits;
she must share that knowledge with the public, so that competition will be
fair after expiration.56
52 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (setting patent term).  The quasi-patent of agency-
enforced regulatory exclusivity lasts a limited time, see Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 359–60,
and trade secrets can be reverse-engineered or independently discovered, respectively, see
Bone, supra note 28, at 257.  Copyright, trademark, and rights of publicity have their own
limits, but are outside the scope of this Article.
53 See Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61
UCLA L. REV. 672, 688–93 (2014).
54 But see id. (arguing for a model tailoring patent terms based on time-to-market); see
also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003)
(arguing that various judicial doctrines already perform some tailoring functions).  The
quasi-intellectual property regime of regulatory exclusivity offers greater opportunity for
tailoring. See Heled, supra note 2.
55 H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 43 (2007) (emphasis added).
56 The best mode requirement lost its teeth with the enactment of the America Invents
Act in 2011, which nominally keeps it but precludes its violation as cause for invalidating a
patent.  35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A); see Love & Seaman, supra note 4 (describing how best
modes can—and likely will—now be kept as trade secrets); Vacca, supra note 50.
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Courts have recognized this rationale in several areas of patent doctrine,
including the question of post-expiration royalties in the recent case of Kim-
ble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC.57  There, the Supreme Court noted,
Patents endow their holders with certain superpowers, but only for a
limited time.  In crafting the patent laws, Congress struck a balance between
fostering innovation and ensuring public access to discoveries.  While a pat-
ent lasts, the patentee possesses exclusive rights to the patented article—
rights he may sell or license for royalty payments if he so chooses.  But a
patent typically expires 20 years from the day the application for it was filed.
And when the patent expires, the patentee’s prerogatives expire too, and the
right to make or use the article, free from all restriction, passes to the public.
This Court has carefully guarded that cut-off date . . . : In case after case,
the Court has construed those laws to preclude measures that restrict free
access to formerly patented, as well as unpatentable, inventions.58
The Court went on to describe its own cases limiting state laws that pro-
vide protection to formerly patented or unpatentable inventions59 and hold-
ing unenforceable “private contract provisions limiting free use of such
inventions.”60  But the Court noted that even though such rules limit private
ordering solutions that may be desirable to all parties involved, they conflict
with “a broad policy favoring unrestricted use of an invention after its pat-
ent’s expiration.”61  “Congress . . . made a judgment: that the day after a
patent lapses, the formerly protected invention must be available to all for
free.”62
III. SECRECY BARRIERS TO POST-EXPIRATION COMPETITION
Complementary use of patents and trade secrecy is in tension with the
goal of open competition outside the bounds of the patent right.  Where the
protected aspects of the invention are different and separable, this tension
may be diffused or justified.  But sometimes the protected aspects are insepa-
rable, and any realistic competition in the market requires use of both pat-
ented and secret aspects of a single invention.  In these cases, trade secrets
can effectively completely block competition, even after patent expiration.
This, I argue, subverts the bargain central to the patent system, and harms
consumers by keeping prices high.
57 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
58 Id. at 2406–07 (internal citations omitted) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964)).
59 Id. at 2407 (first citing Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 230–33; then citing Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152, 167–68 (1989)).
60 Id. (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945)).
61 Id. at 2411.  Notably, the Court did not conclude that post-expiration royalties were
in fact anticompetitive; it held instead that that logic was not enough to overturn the prece-
dent on which Kimble rested, Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). See Kimble, 135 S. Ct.
at 2411.
62 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2413 (citing Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 31–32).
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The goal of post-expiration competition reflects a considered judgment
about the limits of the patent system and how the patent system’s levers
should be used to drive innovation.  As described above, the patent bargain
trades disclosure and innovation for a right to exclude—limited in time, and
subject to open competition after expiration.63  The trade secret trade-off is
different: no expiration, and potentially lower costs, but a narrower scope
and the ability of competitors to invent-around or reverse-engineer.  When
the two are used to provide complementary protection for the same inven-
tion, there is inevitably some tension; any additional protection that trade
secrets provide is (of necessity) beyond that contemplated by the patent bar-
gain.  But this tension is somewhat diffused, both doctrinally and on a policy
level, by the idea that precisely what is being protected is somewhat differ-
ent—different aspects of the invention, ancillary innovations, or the sort of
commercialization data that are recognizably outside the scope of the patent
system.
There are, however, situations where both patented and secret aspects of
an invention are necessary for any reasonable competition.  I look here to
the market for interchangeable goods—that is, where “generic” versions of a
patented product are meant to be used interchangeably with the patented
good as originally marketed.  In many instances, important market substi-
tutes are not generic versions meant to be interchanged seamlessly.  For
instance, consumers buying handheld shavers recognize that different mod-
els will perform differently, and different manufacturers can compete along
those axes of difference.  But competition for other goods really does require
relatively seamless interchangeability.  Consumers switching from a brand-
name drug to a generic version expect them to behave identically.  Doctors
ordering a diagnostic test for their patients expect to get the same results
from different vendors, as long as the ordered test is the same.  And when the
military purchases firearms from different manufacturers or sub-manufactur-
ers, it expects that the firearms will behave identically.  Other examples of
interchangeability exist in many contexts.64  I look here to situations where
interchangeability—and the associated static nature of the products—are rel-
atively uncontroversial.65
63 See supra Part II.
64 For instance, in any situation where substantial costs have been sunk into a technol-
ogy that interacts with a specific good, future versions of that good may need to be identi-
cal.  Printer cartridges, pre-measured coffee pods, and CPU interfaces are all potential
examples of varying complexity, and varying levels of sunk costs.
65 A separate question, and one I have considered in other contexts, involves the
problems that arise from problematic requirements that products or processes remain
static and therefore stifle innovation. See Price, supra note 44, at 519–22 (describing how
regulatory lock-in reduces innovation in drug manufacturing processes).  Where inter-
changeability is required, products don’t change.  In many contexts, this lack of product
innovation is problematic.  I focus here on situations where we may be less concerned with
static products, such as drugs involved in ongoing medical processes or rifles with large
existing stocks in use.
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The best examples of this phenomenon—competition among inter-
changeable versions of a marketed product—occur in the area of drugs.
Doctors and patients expect that different versions of a drug produced by
different manufacturers—brand-name or generic—will perform identically.
Once the patent on atorvastatin expired on November 30, 2011, generic
companies gained the ability to make generic versions of the statin Lipitor, at
the time the world’s best-selling drug.66  Six months later, the price dropped
from approximately $165 to around $15 for a month’s supply as several com-
panies entered the market with generic versions that were expected to per-
form exactly the same.67
This dynamic of robust competition by interchangeable generics imme-
diately following patent expiration was the explicit goal of the Hatch-Wax-
man Act.68  The Act enabled FDA to approve generic versions of an approved
drug so long as they were demonstrated to be equivalent to the reference
product, without the requirement of costly (and potentially ethically dubi-
ous) duplicative clinical trials of the generic drug.69  It also included a mech-
anism designed precisely to enable competition as soon as the patents
expired: the safe harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).70  This provision allows
generic competitors to make and test generic versions of the drug before the
patents on the drug expire, which would otherwise violate those patents.71
The safe harbor is designed to eliminate any potential lag where generic
companies would need to wait until the patents expire before developing
their own versions, conducting equivalence testing, and arranging manufac-
turing capability.  The Act also includes incentives to hasten generic entry by
encouraging challenges to invalid patents that cover a drug.72  It reflects
most clearly a social judgment that the patent bargain on drugs—often con-
sidered the industry for which patents are most important and most domi-
nant—includes a clear expiration date and the goal of immediate,
interchangeable competition.
66 See Cristina Luiggi, Lipitor Patent Expires, SCIENTIST (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.the-
scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/31457/title/Lipitor-Patent-Expires/.
67 See Scott Hensley, How Cheap Can Lipitor Get? Try Free, NPR (Sept. 12, 2012), http://
www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2012/09/12/160997059/how-cheap-can-lipitor-get-
try-free/ (noting the generic costs of $0.50/pill and that some retailers were giving Lipitor
to customers for free in 2012); Todd Hixon, The High Stakes Games Around Generic Lipitor,
FORBES (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/2011/12/07/the-high-
stakes-games-around-generic-lipitor/#c27561176a35 (noting the $165 price for a monthly
prescription in 2011).  This equivalence appears not only in doctor and patient expecta-
tions, and in the judgment of FDA, but also in state law.  State pharmacy laws on generic
substitution typically recognize FDA-approved equivalence by creating requirements that
pharmacies fill prescriptions for atorvastatin with cheaper generic versions unless the pre-
scribing doctor specifically noted otherwise. See Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen,
Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 175–76 (2016).
68 See Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 67, at 173.
69 See id. at 174.
70 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
71 See id.
72 See Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 67, at 173.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL407.txt unknown Seq: 13 11-MAY-17 9:02
2017] expired  patents,  trade  secrets,  and  competition 1623
This Part describes three different ways that innovators can keep secret
information inextricably linked to a product, and can thereby effectively
block any real competition in the relevant market.  First, innovators can keep
secret later-developed information about the product itself necessary to com-
pete in the market.  I refer here not just to best modes that might confer a
competitive advantage, but rather to information effectively necessary to
compete at all in the market for the interchangeable invention.  Second,
innovators can keep secret the details necessary to produce required and
bundled economic complements to the invention, such that the interchange-
able invention itself cannot be meaningfully made or marketed without those
secret complements.  Third and finally, innovators can keep secret later-
developed information not about the invention itself, but necessary to use it
in the way that interchangeability-demanding consumers require.
A. Later-Developed Information About the Product Itself
The first way firms may continue a patent-protected monopoly past the
expiration of the patent term occurs when firms keep secret information they
develop about patented products after patenting that is necessary to make an
interchangeable version of the product itself.  If the market then requires
that products be interchangeable with the initial product for fair competi-
tion, keeping that information as a trade secret can prevent later competition
for the product after patent expiration.
Here, too, the best example of this phenomenon occurs in the area of
drugs—but here, instead of small-molecule drugs, the story focuses on bio-
logics, which are large-molecule drugs (typically proteins) produced by living
organisms.73  Biologics include many of the top-selling drugs available today,
including Avastin, Humira, Enbrel, and others with sales in the billions of
dollars annually.  Biologics make up a growing fraction of the drug-develop-
ment pipeline, and are responsible for a similarly growing fraction of drug
expenditures.74
Unsurprisingly, biologics, like small-molecule drugs, are the subject of
an explicit policy judgment promoting interchangeable competition upon
patent expiration.  This policy is embodied in the Biologics Price Competi-
tion and Innovation Act (BPCIA), which mimics the Hatch-Waxman Act in
large part.75  Under the BPCIA, follow-on firms can rely on the safety and
73 See generally Price & Rai, supra note 6.  A “biological product” is defined as:
[A] virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component
or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized poly-
peptide), or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine
(or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention,
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2012).
74 See Price & Rai, supra note 6, at 1026.
75 See Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–148,
§§ 7001–03, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262).  The
BPCIA was passed as Title VII.A of the Patent Protection and Affordable Care Act. Id.
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efficacy data of the first biologic sponsor, freeing them from the need to
undergo their own full FDA approval process.  To do so, they must demon-
strate that their product is “highly similar” to the reference product, defined
as having “no clinically meaningful differences . . . in terms of the safety,
purity, and potency.”76  Such a follow-on biologic may also go a step further
and be determined fully “interchangeable” with its reference product, the
original biologic, if the follow-on sponsor can show that the biosimilar will
have the same clinical effect as the reference biologic for every individual
patient; and that for biologics administered multiple times, switching
between the reference and the follow-on poses no additional safety or effi-
cacy risk compared to using just the reference product.77  As under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, the BPCIA creates incentives for follow-on firms to chal-
lenge the patents covering biologics in the first place and contemplates a
robust and competitive market for interchangeable (or almost-interchangea-
ble)78 products once the patent has expired.79  Follow-on firms are similarly
shielded from patent infringement liability while they prepare for market
entry following patent expiration.80
But this competition has been slow to materialize, although the BPCIA
has been law for half a decade.81  As Arti Rai and I have argued, this lack of
competition is largely due to the trade secrecy surrounding the way biologics
are manufactured, which protects innovator firms’ monopolies even after
their patents on the biologics have expired.82  Biologics are much more com-
plicated than small-molecule drugs, and many details of their composition
are the result of a complex and idiosyncratic manufacturing process.  Gener-
ally, we lack the scientific tools to characterize biologics adequately just by
examining the final product.83  Nonetheless, FDA, understandably cautious
about much larger and more complex drugs, requires substantial evidence of
similarity, including characteristics of unknown or benign significance.  And
because our understanding of biologics and their manufacture is so rudimen-
tary, such requirements effectively mean that would-be biosimilar competi-
tors must attempt the Herculean feat of reverse-engineering a complex and
76 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(A), (B).
77 Id. § 262(i)(3), (k)(4).
78 The BPCIA creates two classes of biosimilars.  The easier classification is to show
that a product is “biosimilar,” meaning that it is “highly similar” to the reference product,
without “clinically meaningful differences . . . in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of
the product.” Id. § 262(i)(2)(B).  A biosimilar may be “interchangeable”—as that term is
defined under the BPCIA—if it will have the same effect for every patient and if switching
back and forth between the biosimilar and the reference product poses no additional
safety or efficacy risk to using just the reference product. Id. § 262 (i)(2), (k)(4).
79 Id. § 262(k)(6).
80 The safe harbor of the Hatch-Waxman Act applies to biologics as well as to small-
molecule drugs.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
81 See Heled, supra note 2.
82 See Price & Rai, supra note 6, at 1046–48.
83 See id.
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idiosyncratic manufacturing process whose contours cannot be discerned
from the final product.84
This dynamic is illustrated most clearly by a closely related story about an
old blockbuster biologic, Premarin.85  Premarin is a mixture of conjugated
estrogens distilled from the urine of pregnant mares and used to treat symp-
toms associated with menopause.86  Wyeth (since acquired by Pfizer) pat-
ented the estrogen mixtures and methods of purifying them in the 1940s and
1950s.87  However, long after these patents expired, Premarin still lacks an
interchangeable generic competitor.88  Why?  FDA has stated that because
exactly how Premarin works and exactly what it looks like are unknown (as is
the case with many biologics), a generic version must be made in the same
way.89  And no one can figure out how to make Premarin that is the same as
that made by Wyeth/Pfizer.90  It is manufactured in secret in a single loca-
tion in Canada by a process that competitors have been unable to reverse-
engineer, more than seventy years after the drug was first marketed.91
Indeed, the one competitor who claimed to have reverse-engineered the pro-
cess was found to have actually misappropriated Wyeth’s trade secrets by hir-
84 See id. at 1048–49.
85 For a more detailed description of Premarin, see Wyeth v. Nat. Biologics, Inc., Civ.
No. 98-2469, 2003 WL 22282371 (D. Minn. Oct. 2, 2003), aff’d, 395 F.3d 897 (8th Cir.
2005); Price, supra note 44, at 534–36. The actual legal regime around Premarin is some-
what different because it is an old product.  Premarin was originally approved under the
Food, Drug, & Cosmetics Act (FDCA) in 1942, Wyeth, 2003 WL 22282371, at *1, before the
1944 enactment of the Public Health Services Act (PHSA), which created a regulatory
scheme for biologics.  Public Health Services Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944).
See Price, supra note 44, at 534 n.294.  Under the BPCIA, all biologics are now regulated
under the PHSA, so Premarin is now eligible for the biosimilars pathway discussed above.
But before the BPCIA, it was approved under the FDCA and therefore subject to the
generic drug approval pathway.  The essential details of the story remain unchanged.
86 Wyeth, 2003 WL 22282371, at *1.  Notably, Premarin has become substantially less
popular after studies questioned the long-term health benefits—and potentially serious
risks—of hormone replacement therapy.
87 Wyeth’s estrogen extraction patents included, among others, U.S. Patent No.
2,429,398 (filed May 23, 1944); U.S. Patent No. 2,551,205 (filed Oct. 1, 1947); U.S. Patent
No. 2,696,265 (filed Dec. 11, 1948); and U.S. Patent No. 2,834,712 (filed May 27, 1953).
See Wyeth, 2003 WL 22282371, at *2.
88 One competitor to Premarin, Cenestin, a mixture of synthetic estrogens, has been
approved.  However, Cenestin is not approved as a generic equivalent of Premarin, and
may not be automatically substituted for Premarin by pharmacies.  David Goetzl, Meno-
pause Drug Cenestin Takes on Leader Premarin: Boomers’ March Past 50 Attracts Duramed with
New Medication, ADVERTISINGAGE (May 31, 1999), http://adage.com/article/news/meno
pause-drug-cenestin-takes-leader-premarin-boomers-march-past-50-attracts-duramed-medi
cation/62255/.
89 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
FDA Statement on Generic Premarin (May 5, 1997) [https://perma.cc/ZJ7P-STXX].
90 Wyeth, 2003 WL 22282371, at *9.
91 Id. at *2–5.
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ing a research chemist who had consulted for Wyeth, and enjoined from
further work on the drug.92
The story of Premarin illustrates the competitive problem when informa-
tion about a patented product, necessary for interchangeable competition, is
developed after the patent is filed.93  Premarin is protected from competi-
tion because of secret information about how to manufacture the precise
mixture of estrogens later approved by FDA.  The patents may well enable a
skilled artisan to manufacture some mixture of estrogens—but not the mix-
ture approved by FDA.  Similarly, patents on other biologics may enable com-
petitors to manufacture some version of the patented biologic—some form of
erythropoietin, some monoclonal antibody, or some other therapeutic pro-
tein—but not the version approved by FDA.94  And thus competition in those
interchangeable products is sharply limited, if it is not foreclosed entirely.
It is worth pausing to answer one potential response.  One might ask:
Why should innovators enable their competitors to develop an interchangea-
ble version of the product?  Aren’t we better off if there exists a variety of
different products, some better, and some worse?  In many instances, the
answer may be, “of course.”  But in this context of biopharmaceuticals, at
least, that policy decision has already been made.  The Hatch-Waxman Act
and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act both reflect a rea-
soned policy choice for exactly this type of robust competition in inter-
changeable products upon expiration of the relevant products (and any
periods of regulatory exclusivity).95  In this area, where policy levers are so
carefully set, and the incentive scheme so precisely calibrated, trade secrecy
throws a wrench into that system.  It allows indefinite monopolies to continue
after the explicit, limited policy incentives have ended and frustrates the
explicit goal of post-expiration competition.96
B. Required Associated Goods
A separate but closely related form of monopoly extension happens
when a firm maintains a monopoly on other innovations or components
92 Id. at *25.
93 See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 360–61 (2010) (describ-
ing the need for innovation to develop a commercial product after initial patenting).
94 See Price & Rai, supra note 6.
95 See id. at 1040.
96 One question that arises is why, if trade secrecy is enough to maintain exclusivity
after patent expiration, firms choose to patent their invention at all.  There are a few
potential answers.  First, because the trade secrets described here arise after patent filing, it
is possible that firms may not know the potential competitive strength of their trade secrets
until after they have filed for patents (for instance, a firm may not know ex ante whether its
biologic manufacturing process is likely to be reverse-engineerable).  Second, trade secrets
inherently provide probabilistic protection that requires that competitors not successfully
reverse-engineer or independently invent the secret; patents, on the contrary, are more
certain.  Third, patent protection is typically broader than trade secrecy.  Fourth and
finally, patents may provide a better signal to markets or competitors about the innovations
the firm has developed.
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needed to use the patented invention.  This pattern has been noted in
instances where further patents are used to protect the initial innovation.97
Other scholarship has noted instances where inadequate disclosure of infor-
mation known in initial patenting prevents competitors from practicing the
patented invention once the patent expires.98  This Section focuses instead
on the use of trade secrecy to prevent others from making necessary inter-
changeable components or economic complements to a patented device,
even once the patent has expired.
In Christianson v. Colt, the Federal and Seventh Circuits addressed this
particular interaction of patents and trade secrecy.99  There, Colt had long
been the exclusive provider of M-16 assault rifles to the United States and
other militaries.  Its patents on the assault rifle, as well as on several improve-
ments to parts of the rifle, had expired.  However, it maintained technical
specifications and manufacturing tolerances for M-16 components as trade
secrets.  The United States and other militaries require that all M-16 parts be
interchangeable with the equivalent parts on other rifles, whenever and how-
ever manufactured.100  The secret status of Colt’s manufacturing tolerances
and technical specifications thus kept any other manufacturer, not author-
ized by Colt, from competing in the market for M-16s or M-16 parts.  Colt
asserted that the M-16 and its parts could not be reverse-engineered, and its
97 See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and
Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327 (2012) (discussing the use of
additional patents to protect drugs).  Other mechanisms for preserving patent monopolies
may combine patents and other forms of exclusivity.  For instance, if the patent on a drug
has expired, but the drug sponsor holds a method-of-use patent on the only FDA-approved
method of using the drug for treatment, FDA will not approve generic versions of the drug
because there is no patent-free way they can be used.
98 See Fromer, supra note 4; Holbrook, supra note 4.
99 This case is frequently noted for its “peculiar jurisdictional battle,” turning on
whether the Federal Circuit or the Seventh Circuit properly had jurisdiction over a case
where patent law was determinative to the district court’s opinion but appeared first not in
the complaint, but in a rebuttal to a defense. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 803–04 (1988).  The case was appealed to the Federal Circuit, which
held it lacked jurisdiction and transferred to the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 806.  The Seventh
Circuit held the Federal Circuit “clearly wrong” and sua sponte transferred the case back.
Id.  The Federal Circuit disagreed, describing the Seventh Circuit as “clearly wrong,” and
held it lacked jurisdiction, but to end the game of jurisdictional table tennis decided the
case on the merits nonetheless. Id. at 807.  The Supreme Court granted cert., held that
jurisdiction properly lay with the Seventh Circuit, and vacated the Federal Circuit’s opin-
ion, id. at 819—which the Seventh Circuit proceeded nonetheless to cite as persuasive
authority when it finally decided the case. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
870 F.2d 1292, 1298–1302 (7th Cir. 1989).
100 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 609 F. Supp. 1174, 1176–77 (C.D. Ill.
1985).  The reason for this strict interchangeability requirement is that soldiers must be
able to scavenge replacement parts on the battlefield or from other, inoperable rifles. Id.
at 1177.
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expert testified that reverse-engineering a part to guarantee interchangeabil-
ity would be a “massive” task.101
Christianson—who wished to make and sell interchangeable M-16 parts
to military buyers—alleged that Colt was maintaining an improper monop-
oly.102  Colt’s patents, Christianson alleged, were invalid for failure to enable
and failure to disclose the best mode of practicing the invention, because
they did not allow a competitor (Christianson) to make interchangeable
parts for the M-16 rifle.103  The district court agreed, but the Federal and
Seventh Circuits both disagreed, the former holding that:
Patents are not production documents, and nothing in the patent law
requires that a patentee must disclose data on how to mass-produce the
invented product, in patents obtained on either individual parts of the prod-
uct or on the entire product . . . . Thus the law has never required that a
patentee who elects to manufacture its claimed invention must disclose in its
patent the dimensions, tolerances, drawings, and other parameters of mass
production not necessary to enable one skilled in the art to practice (as dis-
tinguished from mass-produce) the invention.  Nor is it an objective of the
patent system to supply, free of charge, production data and production
drawings to competing manufacturers.104
Thus, the Federal Circuit pointed out, the patent that covered the M-16
rifle did not mention the M-16 rifle specifically; it was a patent on a general
rifle, not that rifle in particular.  No doctrine of patent law—whether enable-
ment or best mode—required that Colt disclose how precisely to make an M-
16 rifle or its parts: “Under the law, the question of whether Christianson is
enabled by the patents to engage in mass production of the claimed inven-
tions and to incorporate them in a particular rifle in a manner desired by a
particular customer is simply and totally irrelevant.”105
There is no doubt that the Federal Circuit—and the Seventh Circuit,
which agreed with this reasoning—was correct as a matter of pure patent
doctrine.  Enablement and best mode are defined at the time of patenting,
and the patent in this case was for a type of rifle, broadly defined, not for the
M-16 later adopted by the U.S. military as its principal combat rifle with
attendant steep requirements for parts interchangeability.  But the fact that
patent doctrine does not forbid this practice does not mean that it is good
innovation policy, or that it accurately reflects the goals embodied in the
patent system.  Indeed, the Seventh Circuit noted, with considerably greater
sympathy to Christianson,
101 Id.  The court also noted, “Use of reverse engineering is also hindered by provisions
in Colt’s contracts with the Government, that no scrap parts be sold to unauthorized per-
sons unless such parts are damaged and unrepairable.” Id. at 1182.
102 Id. at 1175.
103 Id. at 1176.
104 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(internal citations omitted).
105 Id. at 1563.
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[I]f Colt can validly claim trade secret protection, it will be able to protect its
commercial products from competition even after the expiration of its pat-
ents.  Christianson points out, and we agree, that the best mode requirement
is intended to allow the public to compete fairly with the patentee following
the expiration of the patents.106
The patent bargain—and patent doctrine—is designed to allow fair competi-
tion after patent expiration.  Mechanisms that block competitors from pro-
ducing interchangeable and required economic complements frustrate that
design.
Notably, the mechanism used by Colt to protect its monopoly involves
both the protection of interchangeable parts and the secrecy of later-devel-
oped manufacturing information, as described in the previous Section.
Much like biologics require detailed manufacturing information to be inter-
changeable, Colt’s M-16 rifle parts required knowledge of strict manufactur-
ing tolerance information—developed after the relevant patent
applications—to be interchangeable.  However, these two strategies need not
always be paired.  For instance, a firm could patent a diagnostic test that, in
its FDA-approved (or CMS-reimbursable) form, uses proprietary reagents.
Once the patent on the test expires, the requirement for proprietary
reagents may continue to block competition.
C. Later-Generated Non-Product Information
A third and distinct form of post-expiration limits to competition comes
when an innovator uses the patented invention to generate information
closely linked to the patented invention, but not about the invention itself.
By linked information, I do not mean business-related information, such as
customer lists, marketing data, or the like.  Instead, I refer to information
that enables the effective functioning of the underlying invention for con-
sumers, such as the data necessary to interpret a diagnostic test.107  Without
that information, follow-on innovators cannot meaningfully compete with
the original innovator, because their products are not actually interchangea-
ble to consumers.
Brenda Simon and Ted Sichelman have described this class of informa-
tion-generating innovations.108  They describe several classes of such innova-
tions, and note the advantage that patents create in collecting later-
106 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292, 1302 n.8 (7th Cir.
1989) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 293 F.
Supp. 555, 555 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1968)).
107 These innovations may be thought of as a specialized case of research tools, though
the research conducted is information closely linked to the tool itself.  For examinations of
the potentially problematic downstream impacts of research tool patents, see, e.g., Arti K.
Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and
Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813 (2001); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intel-
lectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
108 See generally Simon & Sichelman, supra note 8. R
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generated information.109  They also lay out an ex post analysis for when
such data-generating patents are likely to be socially problematic from an
innovation standpoint, focusing on the likelihood that the data generated
will preempt competition.110
The clearest example of this type of competition limit is the extensively
studied case of Myriad Genetics.  Myriad Genetics held patents on two genes,
BRCA1 and BRCA2, that are related to a predisposition to develop breast or
ovarian cancer.  Myriad also held patents on diagnostic methods using
genetic analysis of those genes to identify a predisposition for such cancer.
Accordingly, Myriad had an approximate monopoly on such genetic testing
for many years.  Myriad’s monopoly did not end when the patents expired,
but when they were held invalid as claiming unpatentable subject matter.111
Although competitors promptly rushed to offer BRCA1/2 genetic tests, and
although the testing process was readily duplicable, Myriad maintained—and
still maintains—the lion’s share of the genetic testing market.112  Competi-
tion is limited because, although the underlying technology can be copied,
Myriad’s after-generated information is secret and proprietary.  Over the
years of Myriad’s monopoly, it collected genetic information on well over a
million women, including family histories of cancer incidence.113  Myriad
accordingly has a substantial edge in interpreting the results of a genetic
test.114  While many European genetic testers (who generally were not sub-
ject to Myriad’s robust patent enforcement) have an approximately twenty-
percent rate of returning uninterpretable “variants of unknown significance,”
Myriad’s rate is closer to three percent.115  From the doctor’s point of view,
or the patient’s, the tests are not interchangeable; one is substantially better
than the other.116
One response might be that this is exactly the sort of baked-in lead time
that we should expect when a patent lets one firm have the market to itself
109 See id.
110 See id. at 47–52.
111 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119
(2013) (holding isolated DNA sequences unpatentable and invalidating Myriad’s patents
on isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 sequences); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1333–37 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding Myriad’s diagnostic
methods patents invalid as claiming unpatentable subject matter).
112 See Joseph Walker, Myriad Genetics Fights Off Threats from Rivals, WALL ST. J. (May 3,
2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/myriad-genetics-fights-off-threats-from-rivals-1430645
582 (noting that two years after the Supreme Court’s decision striking down Myriad’s pat-
ents, BRCA screening continued to account for eighty percent of Myriad’s sales, and not-
ing that in addition to other factors, “[d]octors who have stayed loyal say one of Myriad’s
biggest advantages is its private database of test results from the 1.5 million people it has
screened for BRCA mutations, which they say helps Myriad return more accurate results”).
113 See History, MYRIAD, https://www.myriad.com/about-myriad/inside-myriad/history/
(last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
114 See generally Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical
Data as Trade Secrets?, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 585 (2013).
115 Simon & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 19. R
116 See Walker, supra note 112.
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for a protected time.117  But typically we expect other firms to be able to
catch up.  When doctors and patients don’t view competitors’ products as
interchangeable, it’s hard for that to happen.  It’s also especially hard to
duplicate the information involved here; now that patients and doctors have
access to a test with low rates of uninterpretability, they should be expected
to choose that test (and do) over less informative tests, which may propagate
Myriad’s data advantage.118  And as long as it can keep that data as a proprie-
tary trade secret,119 we should expect that competition in the area will be
sharply limited, even though Myriad’s patents no longer protect its business.
This case is admittedly muddier than the preceding two.  It is hard, ex
ante, to draw lines between information that is essential to the functioning of
the invention from the point of view of purchasers versus information that is
just useful for marketing and other commercial endeavors, or classical “know-
how” about how to make, use, or deploy an invention.120  Nevertheless, it at
least demonstrates the possibility that after-arising technical information
about a patented product can effectively block competition for that product.
One response to these three stories is an intellectual shrug.  Companies
are using different intellectual property tools to protect their innovations
from competition—what is surprising about that?  Even the use of trade
secrets alongside patents—long considered mutually exclusive choices—has
become more expected.  But these stories are about something more than
just deriving a competitive advantage.  They highlight ways that firms entirely
117 Dan Burk argues this is a feature, not a bug: patents enable one player to aggregate
information about many different genetic variants that might otherwise remain dispersed.
See generally Burk, supra note 8.
118 We might expect pricing to play a role, where less informative tests by newer market
entrants are priced at a discount.  But as has been extensively described elsewhere, the
health system does a poor job translating price incentives to consumer behavior, because
the roles of choice, use, and payment are separated between doctors, patients, and insur-
ers, respectively.
119 Challenges to this secrecy are arising from an unexpected direction: patients them-
selves.  In 2016, four patients who had undergone Myriad’s testing filed requests under
HIPAA for their full results, including all information about the underlying sequence vari-
ants. See Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, After a Prominent Gene-Testing Firm Declined to Give Patients
Their Complete Data, ACLU Filed a Legal Complaint, SCIENCE (May 19, 2016), http://www
.sciencemag.org/news/2016/05/after-prominent-gene-testing-firm-declined-give-patients-
their-complete-data-aclu-filed.  The Department of Health and Human Services issued a
new regulation in January 2016 that required such disclosure under HIPAA when
requested. See Individuals’ Right Under HIPAA to Access Their Health Information, HHS.GOV,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/access/index.html (last
visited Mar. 7, 2017).  Myriad initially provided just their previously-provided test results,
then provided the full results in February.  The patients nonetheless filed a complaint with
HHS in May 2016.  At least one has expressed an intention to share the genetic informa-
tion she receives with publicly available databases.  If this phenomenon becomes more
widespread, patient access through HIPAA could become a backdoor way to divulge Myr-
iad’s proprietary information about BRCA1/2.
120 See Simon & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 6 (“Identifying problematic patents accu- R
rately ex ante will likely be difficult, so we tend to prefer ex post solutions as a general
matter.”).
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subvert the patent bargain, gaining the advantage of legally protected exclu-
sivity for the patent term, but then using trade secrecy to block all or almost
all competition in the patented product after that term expires.  The public
pays the price for the patent, but then gets only a fraction of the bargained-
for benefit.  To the extent that such a consumer harm is significant, ways to
reduce it are worth considering.
IV. ECONOMIC ENABLEMENT FOR INTERCHANGEABLE GOODS
How might we improve the competitive landscape for interchangeable
goods after patent expiration?121  The central question is what the patentee
actually enables.  Under current law, the patentee must enable the technical
invention covered by the patent.  As described above, however, there are mul-
tiple ways to enable a technical invention while continuing to prevent any
realistic competition for the marketed good itself after the patent has
expired.  The answer, then, may require the patentee to enable more than
just the bare technical invention, but instead to provide sufficient informa-
tion to allow at least some competition in the patented good.  One might
think of this as the idea of “economic enablement,” in a parallel to the cur-
rent doctrine that requires technical enablement.122  Figuring out how to
create an economic enablement requirement presents a complex challenge,
and this Article will not attempt to resolve it.123  Instead, the next Part will
briefly canvas some general issues and then consider where the requirement
might reside: patent law, trade secret law, or somewhere else.
A. General Considerations
In any policy solution focused on economic enablement, several issues
are likely to arise.  First, a policy solution must define what information is
required to economically enable a product.  Second, disclosure requirements
may reduce ex ante innovation incentives.  Third, requirements could create
perverse incentives to avoid the patent system.  Fourth, political economy
challenges complicate the enactment of new disclosure requirements.  Fifth,
disclosure regimes must address potential Takings Clause concerns.
The first question concerns what information is necessary to economi-
cally enable a product (setting aside the complex question of how to define
that product itself).124  Surely not all secrets must be disclosed; there seems
121 If you’re unconvinced that there’s a problem, of course, you can probably skip this
Part.
122 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
123 For some thoughts on a parallel issue, see Sichelman, supra note 93, at 401–02
(describing the use of the doctrine of equivalents to determine what patents would be
covered by a “commercialization patent” that covers only a marketed product and its
equivalents—ideally economic equivalents but likely more practical as technological
equivalents).
124 The question of defining the product itself is conceptually and practically compli-
cated.  What product must would-be competitors be enabled to produce?  A whole rifle, or
just some of its parts?  In some contexts—especially drugs, where the one-product, one-
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to be no intuitive case for disclosing customer lists or marketing strategies.
On the other end, manufacturing techniques necessary to meet the require-
ments of interchangeability should be enabled—that is, after all, the point of
the exercise.  In the middle are manufacturing methods that increase effi-
ciency but are not strictly necessary to produce the interchangeable good.
Disclosure of such information could facilitate competition, but could also
limit ex ante incentives for innovation.  This question also complicates the
inevitable task of monitoring and ensuring compliance with any disclosure
requirement.125
Second, the possibility of a disclosure regime could negatively impact
incentives for innovation.  The argument for intellectual property incentives
is that they create rewards for innovation and therefore drive innovation in
the first place.  Higher rewards presumably drive more innovation—at least,
ex ante.  One answer to this concern is that the incentives for innovation are
already set explicitly in this area by the rules of the patent system, which
presumes competitive entry at the end of the patent term.  Extensions and
rewards beyond that time are presumably beyond the scope of that bar-
gain.126  Perhaps more important are the impacts on later innovation.  Main-
taining trade secrets tied to interchangeability requirements could lead to
stasis rather than innovation.127  Effects on the later innovative behavior of
potential competitors are unclear.128  Overall effects on innovation incen-
tives present an essentially empirical question beyond the scope of this work.
Third, and related, if patent protection becomes particularly unattrac-
tive because it creates additional disclosure requirements, firms may choose
to forgo patents entirely and rely instead on trade secrecy, potentially supple-
mented with regulatory exclusivity if available.129  Increasing trade secrecy
would seem a perverse effect of a disclosure regime, but could result to the
patent syllogism, flawed though it may be, finds support in the FDA definition of prod-
ucts—this question may be easy.  In others, such as multicomponent products, it is substan-
tially more complex.
125 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Dynamic Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1722
(2016) (noting the costs of policing an ongoing disclosure regime).
126 This does not, of course, end the issue of policy calibration.  The patent system may
just be setting the incentive wrong.  However, it seems that if the incentive is set wrong,
that concern is best addressed by explicitly addressing that mismatch, rather than by the
informal, ad hoc, and largely unrecognized sort of interaction described here.
127 See supra Section III.A (noting the lack of manufacturing changes for Premarin for
several decades); see also Price, supra note 44, at 519–22 (describing the idea of regulatory
lock-in of manufacturing methods for small-drug).
128 On the one hand, competitors could potentially engage in cumulative innovation if
able to enter the market and access the information kept secret by the incumbent firm.
On the other hand, competitors might innovate more when required to invent around the
incumbent technology.
129 See Yaniv Heled, Patents v. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We
Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419 (2012) (describing the inter-
play between exclusivity and patent life for biologics); Price & Rai, supra note 6 (describing
the possibility that biologics manufacturers might choose to forgo patent protection in a
mandatory disclosure regime).
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extent that disclosure requirements are onerous enough to drive firms to
choose secrecy instead.130  This choice by a firm would not result in any
change from the status quo in the competitive market for the product itself,
because that product would have been protected by secrecy nonetheless.
However, society and competitors would lose out on whatever information
would otherwise have been disclosed in the patent application.131  This
presumes that firms are able to predict at the time of patent application that
trade secrecy will be able to protect the product for longer than the patent
term, and that narrower trade secret protection will sufficiently deter compe-
tition (e.g., by the market being for an interchangeable good).
Fourth, creation of a disclosure regime involves political economy chal-
lenges.  Inasmuch as the current situation enables incumbent firms to
sharply limit additional competition, we should expect them to react nega-
tively to any attempt to alter the status quo to increase competition.  This is a
feature, not a bug.  In some circumstances, as I have argued previously, dis-
closure of secret competition-limiting information about manufacturing
could lead to broader increases in innovation about manufacturing
processes, a rising tide that could theoretically lift all firms’ boats.132  But
benefits inuring to incumbent firms are not prerequisite for this type of pol-
icy intervention to have a net social benefit.  Nevertheless, the current policy
environment does not appear to favor disclosure.  Congress in 2016 enacted
the Defend Trade Secrets Act, creating additional federal protection for
trade secrets.133  Similarly, in the America Invents Act of 2011,134 Congress
arguably made trade secrecy more attractive by limiting its negative impact
on patentability.135
Fifth and finally, a mandatory disclosure regime would need to address
potential Fifth Amendment Takings Clause issues.  Unanticipated, ex post,
mandatory disclosure of trade secrets could potentially be a taking requiring
130 See Anderson, supra note 34, at 926; Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclo-
sure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 419 (2010) (noting that disclosure doctrines
may encourage firms not to patent).
131 See Fromer, supra note 4, at 548–49; Ouellette, supra note 36; Jason Rantanen,
Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2012).
132 See Price, supra note 1, at 1801.
133 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (to be codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1331–39).
134 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
135 See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for
Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 53–57 (2012) (arguing that the AIA does not allow secret prior
uses to impact patentability). But see Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the Same Thing
It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (2015) (arguing that the AIA does not change
existing law on the issue).
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compensation.136  Addressing this complex issue fully is outside the scope of
this Article.137
B. Doctrinal Context
In the background of all the concerns raised above is a central question:
Where in the law would an economic enablement requirement be located?
1. Patent Law
Patent law provides one obvious candidate for a solution: 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, which imposes disclosure requirements on a patent applicant.138  This
disclosure requirement could be expanded to include not merely technical
disclosure, but economic enablement.
Unfortunately, timing issues create substantial challenges for using pat-
ent law to enforce economic enablement. Section 112 creates requirements
for patentability, and its requirements must be met at the time of the patent
application.139  But the issues described above arise not at the time of patent-
ing, but years later, when particular manufacturing procedures are adopted,
data are collected, or specifications are imposed.  Evidence of competitive
problems is likely to arise even later, once the patent has expired and compe-
tition does not actually materialize despite the presence of would-be competi-
tors.  It is difficult to imagine that a patent examiner, at the time of
application, could foresee what disclosure is necessary to enable a future
would-be competitor to compete upon patent expiration.  More importantly,
the information often simply will not exist at the time of application.140  Pat-
ents are often acquired early in the development of a new product, before
manufacturing methods or specifications are developed, and before ancillary
data are collected.141  Firms cannot disclose information they do not possess,
and under current law there are no provisions for patentees to update patent
applications after the patent issues.142  This issue could potentially be
136 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).  The Court notes the possi-
bility of a taking, but also notes that
as long as [a firm] is aware of the conditions under which the data are submitted,
and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate Government interest, a
voluntary submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic
advantages of a registration can hardly be called a taking.
Id. at 1007.
137 For further discussion, see Price, supra note 1, at 1808; Price & Rai, supra note 6, at
1054–55.
138 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall . . . enable any person skilled in the art to
which [the invention] pertains . . . to make and use the same.”).
139 Id.
140 See Love & Seaman, supra note 4, at 9.
141 See Price & Rai, supra note 6, at 1050–52.
142 See id. (discussing the timing problems of patent disclosure to enable the produc-
tion of biosimilars and suggesting the requirement of patent updates upon regulatory
approval).
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resolved by requiring updated disclosure later in the life of the patent,
though such a proposal has its own complexity.143
Patent law standing alone also provides relatively little help in defining
the product to be enabled, since multiple patents may cover the same mar-
keted product (and typically do), and multiple marketed products may be
based on the invention disclosed in single patent (and frequently are).144
Finally, it is difficult to know what the appropriate remedy would be for a
solution grounded entirely within patent law.  In many instances, the prob-
lem of limited competition becomes apparent only once the relevant patent
(or patents) has expired; invalidating the patent would have no effect.145
These concerns suggest that although economic enablement seems like
a patent law issue, and although the problem seems rooted in the patent
bargain, the solution may best be found outside patent law.
2. Trade Secret Law
If patent law provides unsatisfying opportunities for solving this prob-
lem, trade secret law might function better.  One potential solution would
limit the applicability of trade secret law in the situations described above,
where its ongoing use prevents interchangeable competition for a previously-
patented good.  Economic enablement might be conceived as an affirmative
defense to a trade secret misappropriation claim, making remedies
unavailable.
The problem with this approach is that trade secrecy merely places legal
protections on top of actual efforts to keep information secret.146  But if
firms can continue to keep the information actually secret—as, for instance,
Wyeth could long do in the case of Premarin147—the unavailability of trade
secret protection may make little difference.  Competitors will still be unable
to compete in the marketplace for the interchangeable good.  Nevertheless,
eliminating trade secret protection has potentially useful interactions with
other approaches, discussed below.
143 See id. at 1051–52; see also Fromer, supra note 125, at 1722–31 (proposing that paten-
tees be required to disclose whenever they or their licensees commercialize products using
technology covered by the patent).
144 See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing the
disconnect between a patent and a marketed product in the context of determining for
which products lost-profits damages are available).
145 One possibility might be to look to false marking requirements, which create
(small) government-imposed remedies when firms falsely mark their products with nonex-
istent or inapplicable patents, and also provide a private right of action; a similar provision
could allow competitors to sue for inadequate economic enablement. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 292(a)–(b) (2012); Fromer, supra note 125, at 1733–34.
146 See Price, supra note 1, at 1776.
147 See supra notes 82–93 and accompanying text.
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3. Unfair Competition and Antitrust Law
A third possibility is to step outside intellectual property altogether and
turn to unfair competition and antitrust law.  Preventing competition can
ordinarily run afoul of the Lanham Act or state unfair competition law.148
Those laws do little now because intellectual property often provides a doctri-
nal “out” from anticompetitive behavior—intellectual property law, after all,
deliberately allows firms to restrict competition to provide incentives for
innovation.149  Thus, a firm’s use of trade secrecy to maintain a substantial
competitive advantage does not create an antitrust violation, nor does the
firm’s using patents to keep competitors from the field.
Removing trade secret protection from information that prevents com-
petition in interchangeable once-patented goods could thus enable unfair
competition and antitrust actions.  If firms’ competition-limiting behavior
were no longer shielded by trade secret doctrine, competitors or government
entities could bring suit.150  Such an action would be unusual, since unfair
competition law typically does not contemplate liability for a firm’s failure to
actively help competitors; the closest parallel is likely the contested and lim-
ited essential facilities doctrine.151  This approach might thus set problematic
precedents for other areas of unfair competition law or might otherwise be
especially challenging to implement.
4. Interchangeability Requirements
A last possibility relies on more complex interactions with other market
factors.  This analysis has focused on areas where the particular good is inter-
changeable because of market requirements.  Those requirements can be
grounded in the rules of a regulator, the needs of consumers, or the power
of some other actor.  An economic enablement requirement could be
enforced not broadly, but in specific instances by the power of the other
actor.
Such an external solution is easiest to imagine when interchangeability
requirements come from a regulator.  In the case of FDA, the regulator con-
trols access to the market.  At least theoretically, market access could be con-
ditioned on the disclosure of information required for economic
enablement—either contemporaneous with market access or at some later
time.  To be more specific, FDA could require that manufacturers seeking
148 See Seaman, supra note 24, at 383–84.
149 See FTC v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 756 (2013) (describing the interaction of intellectual
property and antitrust and noting that antitrust principles still apply).
150 Christianson made this argument in his suit against Colt, and the Seventh Circuit
held that patent law provided him with no remedy. See supra Section III.B.  But that does
not mean that such an approach is impossible—merely that it does not exist under current
law.
151 See City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir. 1992)
(describing the doctrine’s requirements).  But see Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004) (noting that the Supreme Court “ha[s]
never recognized such a doctrine”).
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approval to sell a biologic deposit with FDA all relevant manufacturing infor-
mation required to make an interchangeable product,152 with that informa-
tion to be made available to competitors once the patents covering the
product expire.153  Arti Rai and I have suggested such an approach in the
biologics and biosimilars context.154
Another regulator-centric approach might rely not on affirmative agency
disclosure, but on loosening the strictures on what information the agency
can disclose when asked.  Current law creates a substantial hurdle to agency
disclosure of secret information.  For instance, 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) prohibits
FDA from disclosing “any method or process which as a trade secret is enti-
tled to protection” to anyone outside the agency.155  This prevents competi-
tors from just asking FDA for their competitors’ secret manufacturing or
other data via the Freedom of Information Act,156 for instance, or FDA dis-
closing this information sua sponte.  But these disclosure limits are tethered to
the information’s status as a trade secret.  Changing trade secret law would
remove restrictions on agency speech, and could open avenues to disclosing
economically enabling information.157  This approach is not without compli-
cations, including the incentive effects mentioned above, but could be worth
exploring.158
152 In large part, this information is already deposited with FDA as the Chemistry and
Manufacturing Controls section of a Biologics License Application.  This conveniently lim-
its the costs potentially incurred in making tacit knowledge explicit. See Price & Rai, supra
note 6, at 1053.
153 FDA could potentially also mediate some new requirement of updated patent dis-
closure, perhaps set at the time of FDA approval. See id. at 1051–52 (proposing such a
scheme).
154 See id. at 1053–55.
155 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2012).
156 Confidential business information is exempt from disclosure requests under exemp-
tion 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, which covers “trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.”  5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(4) (2012).
157 One approach could be as follows.  A would-be competitor (for instance, a firm
wishing to develop a biosimilar) could file a declaratory judgment action seeking to
declare that the secret preventing competition prevented economic enablement, and that
it should therefore no longer be protected by trade secret law.  After obtaining such a
declaratory judgment, the plaintiff could then seek the information from a regulator hold-
ing the information, via a FOIA request or some other mechanism.  Without the limita-
tions of trade secrecy protection, the agency would be free (and indeed, obligated) to
disclose the relevant information to the would-be competitor.
158 This process does raise a potential free-riding concern, that other competitors could
free-ride off the efforts of the first-mover firm in filing the suit.  This dynamic exists in the
context of generic drugmakers challenging patents under the Hatch-Waxman Act; to com-
bat the problem, first-movers are given 180 days of regulatory exclusivity.  One could imag-
ine a tailored regime under which information is disclosed under a timed release, so that
the first entity to file a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate trade secret pro-
tection would be entitled to a limited period when only it could see the secret information.
Such an approach would be outside the existing framework of FOIA disclosures, and its
contours are outside the scope of this Article.
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Genetic tests present an interesting middle case.  On the one hand,
genetic tests require regulatory approval—FDA approves genetic tests as in
vitro diagnostic devices.159  FDA could potentially demand disclosure as a
condition of approval, just as it could for drugs or biologics.  However, FDA
does not actually administer an interchangeability regime for diagnostic
tests—there are no “generic” versions of a diagnostic test.  Instead, such a
requirement, to the extent it formally exists, resides with the providers of
medical care—hospitals and insurers.  Potentially, hospital systems or insur-
ers could demand as a condition of use or reimbursement that original devel-
opers—Myriad, for instance—share data as a condition of use.  But the
mechanisms for such a process would be complex and challenging.160
Finally, in situations where the external requirement is contractual—
that is, the buyers require that products meet certain specifications, as is the
case with the U.S. military and the M-16 rifle161—one could imagine a con-
tractual solution.  That is, if the military wants robust competition to drive
down the price of interchangeable M-16 rifles, could it not require by con-
tract that Colt agree to share technical specifications with competitors?  It is
unclear why this does not already occur.  Perhaps the military, and other
potential interchangeable-goods purchasers, might be more concerned with
reliability and interchangeability than with competition and lower prices.
Timing may also play a role; if contracts are negotiated early in the patent
term, the possibility of long-term, secrecy-enforced limits on competition may
not yet be apparent.  Once those limits actually manifest, sunk costs may limit
the possibility of renegotiating those aspects of the contract.
All of this adds up to a rather unsatisfying mélange.  Grounding eco-
nomic enablement in the context of market limitations on interchangeability
159 Notably, genetic tests conducted by a centralized laboratory were long largely immu-
nized from oversight under FDA’s decision to exercise enforcement discretion for labora-
tory-developed tests.  FDA announced in 2014 that it intended to apply its standard risk-
based regulatory framework to laboratory-developed tests. See Letter from Sally Howard,
Deputy Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Tom Harkin, Chairman of the Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, U.S. Senate (July 31, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/down
loads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/UCM407409
.pdf.  However, FDA has since announced that it will delay this plan. See Sheila Kaplan,
FDA Puts off Closing Lab-Test “Loophole,” Leaving Decision to Congress and Trump, STAT (Nov.
18, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/11/18/fda-lab-test-loophole/.
160 In the medical context, interestingly enough, another mechanism potentially
already exists.  Those truly demanding interchangeability are neither doctors nor insurers,
but instead the patients—who arguably have a right to their own information under
HIPAA.  And, in fact, the HHS OIG has recently held that patients have the right to the full
details of their genetic data when they undergo genetic testing, including the details of
non-cancerous variants.  There is a movement developing among patients to request and
disclose this information, eliminating the ability of firms like Myriad to keep those data
secret.  Couzin-Frankel, supra note 119; cf. Barbara Evans, Big Data and the Meaning of
Autonomy in a Crowd, in BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds.,
forthcoming) (on file with author) (describing the possibility of patient groups contribut-
ing to medical dataset on a community level).
161 See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
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means that different situations will require different interventions.  There are
benefits, too—in particular, whatever external actor setting interchangeabil-
ity requirements is presumably in a good place to define what exactly the
relevant product is and what sort of information is likely necessary for a com-
petitor to satisfy that requirement.
Overall, economic enablement would be a messy requirement to imple-
ment.  Assuming it is a worthwhile requirement—a rather substantial assump-
tion, and one about which I remain uncertain—patent law provides little
opportunity to impose an economic enablement requirement.  Trade secrecy
is a somewhat more attractive possibility, but it still needs some mechanism of
actual disclosure, rather than just refusing to punish misappropriation.  In
situations where regulators closely monitor market access and exercise sub-
stantial power, the regulator may be able to enforce an economic enable-
ment requirement.  But this doesn’t cover all situations, though many of the
most important may well be in the biopharmaceutical realm and thus amena-
ble to this intervention.  Other situations may be even more ad hoc.
CONCLUSION
The patent system reflects a bargain between inventors and society.
Society’s carrot for innovation is a limited period of exclusivity protected by a
patent—with an emphasis on limited.  The courts and Congress have both
made decisions reflecting a policy that patent terms are designed to end.
Several doctrines support the idea that after the patent term’s expiration, the
expectation is that competition becomes at least possible—and, ideally,
prompt and robust.  But in markets where the specific contours of a product
must be closely duplicated, and are hard to reverse-engineer or indepen-
dently develop, firms can use trade secrecy to protect innovative information
necessary for that matching.  In essence, firms can prevent a market for inter-
changeable goods from getting off the ground.  This block on competition
harms consumers and subverts the patent bargain, and while there may be no
need for opprobrium, there is cause to consider policy moves that could
increase the possibility of meaningful competition after the expiration of pat-
ent exclusivity.
